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H – 1125

International Court of Justice

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Filed Dec. 10, 1945
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H-1125

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING, et al

defendants

D O C U M E N T B O O K

In re: COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U. S. Chief of Counsel

To be argued by: SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

Of Counsel:

SIDNEY J. KAPLAN
Commander, USCGR

ROY H. STEYER
Lt. (jg), USNR

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H1125 - 0003

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and Japan and Aggressive
War against the United States

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C DOCUMENTS

H1125-0004A

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-74
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 162
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

Stamp: Copy Most Secret

Naval War Staff

Naval War Staff / 1 Div. B No I sp 1289/41
Most Secret, S.o.only

Fuehrer's H.Q. 14 July 1941

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

S.o. only
access only through Officer

OKW/ WFSt/Dep.L(II)Org.
No. 441219/41 Most Secret

13 Copies
5th Copy

Distribution of the copies

Copy 1 - Naval War Staff
" 2 - Chief of M Wa Wi
" 3 - Chief of K
" 4 - Chief of A Wa

By virture of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnal and of material supplies:

1.) In general:
The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.

Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.

The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, which must be greatly increased in strength.

2.) - 7.) (Technical particulars).

(signed) Adolf Hitler

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-74

14 November 1945.

I, CLARE BOULTER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. C-74.

CLARE BOULTER
P/O, W.R.N.S.,
59549.

H1125 - 0005

C-74

H1125 - 0006

Exhibit U.S.A. 151
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-75
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Only by Officer

Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

Führer's Headquarters
5 March 1941

(Various handwritten notations and stamps)

14 copies
2nd copy

Basic Order No. 24

regarding collaboration with Japan

The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. /Marginal note - "slightly exaggerated"/

2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions to himself.

3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

H1125 - 0007

c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -- extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

Signed in draft: Keitel

Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander

Distribution:
Commander in Chief of the Army (Army General Staff): 1st copy
Commander in Chief of the Navy (1st Sect., Naval War Staff): 2d copy
Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Air Force Gen. St.): 3d copy
Armed Forces High Command: Joint Operations Staff: 4th copy
Office of Foreign Counter-espionage, 5th copy
Chief of Foreign Affairs (simultaneously for Foreign Office) 6 - 7 copies
Economic Armament Office, 8th copy
Mercantile and Economic War, 9th copy
Dept. L, 10 - 14 copies

- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-75

21 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-75.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

H1125-0008

Part of Exhibit G.B. 122

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. C-152
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top military secret

Chefsache!

Naval War Staff
B.Nr.1. op 355/41 g.K. Only by officer!

Audience of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 Mar 1600 hrs.

(Present: Chief of OKW, Gen. Jodl, Fregatten Kapitän von Puttkamer)

* * * * * *

Exam. No. 2

9.) Preparations for Marita . . .

B) Personnel Position . . . .

f) The C-in-C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

* * * * * *

11.) Japan /Raeder speaking/

Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Phillipines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.

According to remarks by Admiral Nomura, Minister Matsuoka has grave doubts about the Russian question and wants to make inquiries particularly about that.

The C-in-C of the Navy recommends (during personal conversation with Hitler) that Matsuoka be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-152

20.11.45

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-152.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

C-152

PS

DOCUMENTS

H1125-0008A

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 376-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Major(General Staff)

Freiherr von Falkenstein

FUHRER's H.Q.

(Addressed to an unspecified General and marked "Chefsache")

29/10/40

In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10.00 AM. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military questions current here for your personal information before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.

The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a particularly ticklish business.

1). At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.

2). The question of beginning preparations in Libya in conjunction with Italy is to be examined in the light of a report by General Ritter von Thoma which will be received during the next few days.

In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the Führer by Field Marshall Keitel with regard to strength required, date of offensive, etc. Field Marshall Keitel and Marshal Badoglio will then meet in mid-November and will settle details. Large-scale preparations should not be expected before then.

The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been informed by us of the necessity for timely disposal of special war material, equipment and clothing.

3). No orders respecting "Fall Ost" (Case East) have been given and no orders are to be expected at the moment.

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a trifling matter.

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by the Führer and are not to be speeded up.

4). No activity should be expected at present on the part of Spain. The conversation between the Führer and Franco therefore covered only economic collaboration and long-term developments.

The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though it will have to be treated with extreme care.

The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff (Erkundungsstab) to Spain where it willcooperate with Admiral Canaris; this has been authorised by the Führer. The G.F will request permission to participate on its own account.

There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme Command; the details requested in teleprinter message 00 926/40 are required for this purpose.

5). The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:-

376-PS

Exhibit U.S.A. 161
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

H1125-0009

H1125-0010

SECRET

a). No other operational commitment,
b). Portuguese neutrality,
c). Support of France and Spain.

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the C.in.C.

Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfürst (C. in C. G.A.F Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.

6). C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as a result of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed Forces Operations Staff/Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret and Chefsache dated 22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the British will develop against Norway, and has requested naval and air force reinforcements. The question of moving Stuka Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my opinion that Stuka units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but would however request that the matter be further examined.

7). General von Böttticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specificially G.A.F one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.

(Sgnd) Falkenstein.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 376-PS

24 August 1945

I, Fred Neibergall, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation of Document No. 376-PS

FRED NIEBERG LL
2nd Lt., Inf.
O-1335567

H1125-0011

Exhibit U.S.A. 154
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1538-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Secret

Office Foreign Intelligence
Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs III org) German abbrev.

May 24, 1941

Stamp: Air-Corps-Operational — 7 copies
Staff I a — 2 copies

May 24, 41
No. 279.

Stamp: Top Secret
(to be forwarded) By Officer only

To be presented
to the Chief of the
Armed Forces High Command.

The Military Attache Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.

In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and U.S.A. in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between U.S.A. and Germany. Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:

To be presented
to the Chief of the
Office Foreign
Intelligence (simul-
taneously for ZL)

1) In case U.S.A. enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.

2) Possible war Russia-Germany causes U.S.A. entry into war. Japanese action as mentioned under 1) plus preparation of possible attacks (on) Wladiwostok and Blagowesqensk.

(To be presented
to the)
Operational
Staff of the Air-Forces
I.C.

3) Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for Japanese Armed Forces.
I am stressing first that Japanese recognition of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of hostilities.

Signature: "
Buckner

U R Ia

Schmid (in crayon)

May 24

Copy to:

L.
3 Skl
Sonderstb H.H.K.

1538-PS

H1125-0012

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1538-PS

28 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1538-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1125-0013

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FOREIGN OFFICE
RAM NO. 56/R

Berlin, 2 March 1941
Strictly secret

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.

signed:

Ribbentrop

To: The German Embassy in
Ankara
Madrid
Moscow
Rome (Quir.)
Rome (Vat;)

The German Legation in
Athens
Belgrade
Bern
Budapest
Bukarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg (Bratislava)
Sofia
Stockholm

one each

65215

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
Continued

Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R

Strictly secret

Extract

from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the RAM,) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia - a necessity for avoiding a two - front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German - Japanese relationship. Now the German - Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

* * * * *

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hoped to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. When we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.

At sea the commitment of the U - boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this

1834-PS

H1125-0014

H1125-0015

impossible. In East Asia America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible but Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. It adds up for practical purposes to the creation of American air bases in England. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and thereby split up its forces. In an air duel - Europe vs. England - Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers..

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English - American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won to-day militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

2) A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3) In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that

H1125-0016

America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feeling against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning Japan's attitude in case of America's entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.

The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other had, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). Enland too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U. S. A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1834-PS

November 28, 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 1834-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

1834-PS

H1125-0017

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.a. 152
Filed Dec. 19, 1945

(Page 46760 to Page 46761, Line 18)

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

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(Page 46767 to Page 46769, Line 18)

Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears, expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the PHILLIPPINES and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

MATSUOKA replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five

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years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, ROOSEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the EAST. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to feel the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.

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Page 46775, Line 18, to page 46777, Line 20)

MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject, which had been breached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the FUHRER - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

MATSUOKA remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

The RAM replied, that here too, the FUHRER had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

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MATSUOKA replied in this connection, that some of the younger, expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which threatened from American, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

X X X X X X X X X

Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1877-PS

I, MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL, T/5, 33378374, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1877-PS

MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL,
T/5, 33378374

H1125-0020

H1125-0021

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES
regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER
and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin
on the 4th of April 1941.

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal GASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanes Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so , that no American could land in Europe. She would

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conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanes - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight, anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstandes than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignity of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could ad-

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

vance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that one the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he woul indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1881-PS

4 April 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN
Pfc.
33925738

1881-PS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 153
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

Aufz RAM 21/41

Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsnoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941

(pages 2 to 3:)

Matsnoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

In answer to a remark by Matsnoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuhrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.

(pages 9 to 11)

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsnoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.

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Matsnoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

Berlin, the 7th of April 1941

Sig. Schmidt

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS

C. 19 November 1945

I, Virginia Von Schon, X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt of Document No. 1882-PS.

C. Virginia Von Schon
X-046318

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Exhibit U.S.A. 150
Filed Dec 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2195-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

File Memorandum

Today I visited General O s h i m a . The conversation ranged over the following subjects:

1.) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.

2.) We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr), he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only in case of war.

3.) Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.

4.) We then discussed the Mahometan movement. He told me that a Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan, but that he had been expulsed later because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the Afghan government.- I told him that I had a police officer there and that the two could very well collaborate once he again had someone there.

5.) He told me confidentially that he had brought a piece of real estate in Falkensee under the name of a middleman. 6 Russians were employed there, writing and priting leaflets, which were flown into Russia from Poland in small balloons, when the wind was favorable. He had reports and proofs from Russia that they had arrived in good condition and that they were obviously being passed around amony the people very diligently.

6.) Also he had bought a motor boat in order to bring leaflets from Roumania to the Crimea via the Black Sea. However, this had miscarried in the fall, but he would repeat it once more in summer.

Berlin, 31 January 1939

The Reichsführer -SS:
(signed) H. Himmler

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2195-PS

27 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certufy that I am thoroughly conversant with English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of document 2195-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

2195-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2506-PS
OFFICE OF THE U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Documents of German Politics (Politik)
Established by the University for Politics
Continued by the German Academy for Foreign Science
(Deutsches Auslandswissensdraftliches Institute)

Compiled by Dr. Hans Volz, 4th Edition, 1940, Junker & Dunnhaupt Publishers, Berlin.

(pages 173 to 174:)

31. Protocal of the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement of 6 November 1937.

The Government of the German Reich,
The Italian Government, and
The Imperial Japanese Government,
Taking into consideration that the Communist International constantly endangers the civilized world in the West and the East, disturbs and destroys its peace and order.

Convinced that this danger can be reduced and eliminated only by close cooperation of all states interested in maintaining peace and order, considering that Italy, which since the beginning of the Fascist government has fought this danger with inflexible determination and has exterminated the Communist International in its territory, has decided to oppose the common enemy side by side with Germany and Japan, who themselves are inspired with the same will to ward off the Communist International,

Have in accordance with article II of the agreement against the Communist International concluded in Berlin on 25 November 1936 between Germany and Japan, (1) agreed as follows:

Article 1.

Italy joins in the agreement of which the text is appended, (2) as well as the supplementary protocol against the Communist International which was concluded between Germany and Japan on 25 November 1936.

Article II

The three powers signing the present protocol agree that Italy is considered as an original signatory of the agreement mentioned in the preceding article as well as the supplementary protocol, whereby the signing of the present protocol is equivalent to signing the original text of the above-mentioned agreement and the supplementary protocol.

Article III

The present protocol is an integral part of the agreement and the supplementary protocol.

Article IV

The present protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages, and each text is considered the original. It is effective the day of the signing.

In witness whereof, the signatories duly authorized by their respictive governments have signed this protocol and affixed their seals thereto.

Executed in triplicate at Rome the 6th day of November 1937, in the XVI year of the Fascist era, that is the 6th day of November of the 12th

2506-PS

H1125-0027

Year of the Showa period.

signed Joachim von Ribbentrop
signed Ciano
signed N. Hotta

3. VB 7 November 1937 --- Foreign politics monthly, volume 4 (1937), p. 873f. RGBL 1938 II, p. 25 --- On the day on which Italy joined the anti-Comintern agreement the Fuhrer sent telegrams to Mussolini and the Japanese Prime Minister Prince Konoye (printed: VB 7 November 1937).

1. Compare Documents of German Politics volume 4, Doc. 28. Article II deals with the accession of other states.

2. Not reprinted here.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2506-PS

I, C. Virginia Von Schon, X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 2506-PS

C. Virginia Von Schon
X-046318

H1125-0028

H1125-0029

Exhibit U.S.a. 164
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2507-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Volume IX, 1, No. 74, Pages 497-9

Note of 11 December 1941, from the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Counsellor of the Legation Morris.

Sir:

"The Government of the United States of America having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever increasing measure all rules of neutrality in favor of the adversaries of Germany and having continually been guilty of the most severe provocations toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the European war, provoked by the British declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, has finally resorted to open military acts of aggression.

"On September 11, 1941, the Preseident of the United States of America publicly declared that he had ordered the American Navy and Air Force to shoot on sight at any German war vessel. In his speech of October 27, 1941, he once more expressly affirmed that this order was in force. Acting under this order, vessels of the American Navy, since early September 1941, have systematically attacked German naval forces. Thus, American destroyers, as for instance the Greer, the Kearney, and the Reuben James, have opened fire on German submarines according to plan. The Secretary of the American Navy, Mr. Knox, himself confirmed that American destroyers have attacked German submarines.

"Furthermore, the naval forces of the United States of America, under order of their Government and contrary to international law have treated and seized German merchant vessels on the high seas as enemy ships.

"The German Government therefore declares:

"Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules of international law in her relations with the United States of America during every period of the present war, the Government of the United States of America from initial violations of neutrality has finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. The Government of the United States of America has thereby virtually created a state of war.

"The German Government, consequently, discontinues diplomatic relations with the United States of America and declares that under these circumstances brought about by President Roosevelt Germany too, as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America."

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2507-PS

7 December 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/4, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2507-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/4, 33812169

2507-PS

H1125-0030

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2508-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TITLE PAGES

1st page:

Documents of German Politics
Edited by
Regierungsrat Paul Meier-Benneckenstein
President of the German Academy for Politics
Volume 4
The German Academy for Politics, Berlin

2nd Page:

Germany's Rise as a Great Power
compiled by
Axel Friedrichs

1937

Junker and Dunnhaupt Publishers/Berlin

Heading of # "28".

pp. 166-168

28. Treaty between the Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Government of Japan regarding the common fight against the Communist International of 25 November 1936.

2508-PS

H1125-0031

Excerpt from: Documents of German Politics ("Dokumente der Deutschen Politik"). Edited by Regierungsrat Paul Meier-Benneckenstein, President of the German Academy for Politics (Hochschule fur Politik). Volume 4. The German Academy for Politics, Berlin. Volume 4: Germany's Rise as a Great Power (Deutschlands Aufstieg zur Grossmacht Compiled by Axel Friedrichs. Published by Junker and Dunnhaupt, Berlin 1937.

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of co-operating in the defence against Communist subversive activities; have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The High Contracting Powers agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

Article 3

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the future period of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936 -- that is, November 25 of the 11th year of the Showa Period.

(signed) Von Ribbentrop, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich.

(signed) Mushakoji, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

2508-PS

H1125-0032

Supplementary Protocol

On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting Powers will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over the activity of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International.

(b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting Powers will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities.

(c) In order to facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities of the two High Contracting Powers as provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.

Berlin, November 25, 1936 -- that is, November 25 of the 11th year of the Showa Period.

(signed) Von Ribbentrop,
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador of the German Reich.

(signed) Mushakoji,
Imperial Japanese Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2508-PS

19 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/Sgt., AUS, 33,812,169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true partial translation of Document No. 2508-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/Sgt. AUS
33,812,169

2508-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2643-PS
OFFICE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 149
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

"Reichsgesetzblatt", Part II, Berlin,
November 28, 1940, No. 41, P. 279.

ANNOUNCEMENT

concerning the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on November 25, 1940

On September 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed by Representatives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese Governments. The Pact came into force upon signature. It is published below.

Berlin, November 25, 1940

THE REICH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

von Ribbentrop

* * *

2643-PS

H1125-0033

THREE-POWER PACT

BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist

H1125-0034

to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Article 4

For the purpose of implementing the present pacts, joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.

Article 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At the proper time before expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this pact and have hereunto apposed their seals.

Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th day of September, 1940, in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of the Showa era.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ciano

(Signature of the Japanese Representative)

H1125-0035

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2643-PS

7 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the German text of Document 2643-PS.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt., Inf.
01332102

H1125-0036

H1125-0037

Exhibit U.S.A. 155
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2896-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TELEGRAM
(Code)

Special Train Westfalen No. 707, 10 July 1941, 2:51 P.M.
Arrival: 10 July 1941, 4:00 P.M.

1. Code Office AA No. 634
2. Diplogerma Tokio

Telegram in code (Secret code system)
To: Ambassador personally.

* * * * *

(Page 24953

. . . . 4.) Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese foreign minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all times its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.

It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan wants to secure for herself further possessions in the South, Indo-China, etc., just as every measure of Japan directed toward expansion is principally welcomed by us. I shall give you detailed instructions, within the near future, relative to the consequences which might, and no doubt will, result from the occupation of Iceland by American military forces, and the attitude which we will take toward Japan in this connection. As directive for talks we can advise you already today that the sending of American military forces to the support of England into a territory which has been officially announced by us as combat area, shows not only Roosevelt's aggressive intentions, but the fact of the intrusion of American military forces into the combat area to the support of England is in itself an aggression against Germany and Europe. After all, one cannot enter a theater of war in which two armies are fighting, and join the army of one side without the intention of shooting and without actually doing so. I do not doubt for a moment that in case of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and America, in which case today already it may be considered as an absolutely established fact that only America will be the aggressor, Japan will fulfill her obligations, as agreed upon in the Three Power Pact. However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British empire which are important

H1125-0038

for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.

RIBBENTROP

NOTE: Transmitted to Embassy in Tokio
under No. 1018
Telegram control, 10 July 1941.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2896-PS

29 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2896-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2896-PS

H1125-0039

Exhibit U.S.A. 156
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 2897-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telgram
(Secret Cipher System)

Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.
Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.

As fast as possible!

#1217 dated 13.7
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs
Arrived Tokio 12 July 1941

I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby, is the disunity among Activist groups which without unified command follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.

Ott.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. 2897-PS

18 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts from Document 2897-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt
33779426

2897-PS

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 2898-PS
Continued

Exhibit U.S.A. 163
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

Telegram
(Secret Cipher System)

Tokyo 30 November 1941 10.10 hrs.
Arrived 2 December 1941 14.40 hrs.

#2397 dated November 30.

The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is very great. The Japanese government since it sent Ambassador Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he told me. He is convinced that this position is in our favor and makes the United States think that her entry into the European war would be risky business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These differences of opinion concern, for example, the further treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest (1 group missing) however resulted from the U.S. attempt to make the three power agreement ineffective. U.S. suggested to Japan to conclude treaties of non-aggression with the U.S., the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to prevent Japan's entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty obligations and for this reason American demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions promised by the U.S. and merely mentioned that grave decisions were at stake.

The U.S. is seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.

Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and she hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the Three power agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that there could be no doubt about Germany's future position. Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.

Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U.S.Note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the compromise seeking politicians here. For these circles America's position, especially in the China question, is very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three power pact as being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-U.S. negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the axis powers.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO.2898-PS

17 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of Document No. 2898-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt
33779426

2898-PS

H1125-0040

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOC NO. 2911 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 157
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

SECRET STATE MATTER

Notes concerning the discussions between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942.

He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia's) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the Führer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2911 PS

20.11.45

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2911 PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738

H1125-0041

H1125-0042

Exhibit U.S.A. 159
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 2929-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

notation RA Nr 23/43 top secret

NOTES.

on the conference of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs with Ambassador OSHIMA on 18 April 1943 in FUSCHL.

TOP SECRET.

* * * * * *

The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2929-PS

18.11.45

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2929-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4
37446052

H1125-0043

Exhibit U.S.A. 165
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2932-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 1 and 2 up to "doesen Weygehen"

TOP SECRET

Aufz. FÜ 66/41 gRs

Reception of the Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima, by the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 o'clock in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister.

First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.

The Fuehrer continues: "You gave the right declaration of war!" This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike - as hard as possible, indeed - and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the future.

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CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2932-PS

18 November 1945

I, C. Virginia von Schon. X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant in the English and German languages, and that this is a true translation of the indicated excerpts of Document No. 2932-PS.

C. Virginia von Schon
X-046318

2932-PS

H1125-0044

Ex. 122

DOCUMENT No. 2944-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"PEACE AND WAR, U. S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1931 - 1941", Published For the U. S. Department of State by U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943

184

Statement by the Secretary of State, September 27, 1940

The reported agreement of alliance /Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy, signed in Berlin 27 September 1940/ does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of United States in the determing of this country's policies.

H1125-0045

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.2944 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"Krieg und Frieden - Auswaertige Politik der Vereinigten Staaten (1931-1941) "

Herausgegeben fuer das Auswaertige Amt der Vereinigten Staaten von der Regierungs-Druckerei, Washington, D.C. 1943.

" 184

Eine Erklaerung des Aussenministers, am 27.September 1940.

Der berichtete Abschluss eines Buendnis-Vertrages (Dreier Pact zwischen Deutschland, Japan und Italien gezeichnet in Berlin am 27 September 1940) aendert nicht wesentlich die Lage, die seit einigen Jahren bestanden hat, soweit die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten in Betracht kommt. Die Bekanntmachung des Buendnisses macht bloß fuer alle die Beziehungen klar, welche seit einer langen Zeit bestanden haben und auf welche diese Regierung wiederholt aufmerksam gemacht hat. Daß ein solcher Vertragsabschluss im Gange war, ist seit einiger Zeit bekannt gewesen, und diese Tatsache wurde voll beruecksichtigt von der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten bei der Festsetzung der Politik dieses Landes."

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2944 PS

18.11.45

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN M/Sgt. 33779426 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true und correct translation of Document No. 2944 PS.

WOLFGANG E THORMANN
M/Sgt. 33779426

2944-PS

H1125-0046

DOCUMENT NO. 2945-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"PEACE AND WAR, U. S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1931 - 1941", Published For The U. S. Department of State By U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943

Joint Resolution Declaring That a State of War Exists Between The Government of Germany and the Government and the People of the United States and Making Provision To Prosecute The Same

Whereas the Government of Germany has formally declared war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Government of Germany; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Approved, December 11, 1941, 3:05 p.m., E.S.T.

H1125-0047

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PS 2945
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

(Dokument No. 272) "Frieden und Krieg"
Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten, 1931 - 1941

Herausgegeben fuer das Auswaertige Amt der Vereinigten Staaten von der Regierungs-Druckerei Washington
55 Stat. 796

Gemeinsame Beschlussfassungs-Erklaerung, den Kriegszustand zwischen der deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des amerikanischen Volkes und die Massnahmen fuer die Durchfuehrung desselben betreffend.

In Erwaegung, dass die deutsche Regierung formell Krieg an die amerikanische Regierung und an das amerikanische Volk erklaert hat - wird vom Senat und dem Repraesentanten-Haus der Vereinigten Staaten, im Congress versammelt beschlossen, dass der Kriegszustand zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der deutschen Regierung, die den Vereinigten Staaten den Krieg aufgezwungen hat, hiermit formell erklaert wird; und dass der Praesident hierdurch bevollmaechtigt und beauftragt wird, die gesamten Marine- und militaerischen Kraefte der Vereinigten Staaten und alle verfuegbaren Mittel der Regierung fuer die Kriegsfuehrung gegen Deutschland anzuwenden; um den Kampf zu einem erfolgreichen Ende zu bringen, gelobte der Congress der Vereinigten Staaten hiermit alle Mittel des Landes zur Verfuegung zu stellen.

Genehmigt, 11.Dez. 1941, 15,05 Uhr E.S.T.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT PS 2945
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT. 33779426, hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document PS 2945.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT. 33779426

H1125-0048

Exhibit U.S.A. 158
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2954-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Pages F 12027 & F 12028)

TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp) Minutes Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs 14/43 top secret (in ink)

MINUTES

on the discussion of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with Ambassador OSHIMA on 6 March 1943.

Ambassador OSHIMA declared, that he received a Telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger, which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction, that it would be in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention, to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.

The RAM brought up the question after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and American, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However it would be more correct, that all powers, allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good, when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently, that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.

* * * * * *

(Page F 12035 Line 5 to Line 14)

Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts - except those in China - there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself, if the necessary forces would not be ready for that.

* * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2954-PS

18 November 1945.

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt(jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2954-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE,
Lt(jg),USNR, 391590.

2954-PS

H1125-0049

Exhibit U.S.A. 166
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOC. 2987-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Entries In Diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano
3 December - 8 December 1941

December 3,
Wednesday

Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his manouver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

December 4,
Thursday

Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it. . . .

* * *

December 5,
Friday

A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't. . . . .

* * *

December 8,
Monday

A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that

H1125-0050

America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis. .

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2987-PS

20 November 1945.

I, KENNETH R. BOYLE, Captain, Infantry, 0447520, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and Italian languages, and that the above is a correct and true partial translation of Document No. 2987-PS.

KENNETH R. BOYLE
Captain, Infantry
0447520

H1125-0051

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Eintragungen im Tagebuch des Grafen Galeazzo Ciano, 3. bis 8. Dezember 1941.

3. Dezember
Mittwoch

Sensationeller Schritt Japans. Der Botschafter bat um eine Audienz mit dem Duce und las ihm eine lange Erklaerung ueber den Fortschritt der Verhandlungen mit Amerika vor; er schloss mit der Behauptung, dass sie auf ein totes Geleis angekommen sind. Er bezog sich dann auf die in Frage kommende Klausel im Dreier-Pakt und bittet, dass Italien sofort nach Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten Krieg an Amerika erklaert und schlaegt die Unterweichnung eines Vertrages, keinen gesonderten Frieden abzuschliessen, vor. Der Uebersetzer, der dieses Ersuchen uebersetzte, zitterte wie ein Blatt. Der Duce gab volle Zusicherungen, behielt sich aber das Recht vor, mit Berlin zu konferieren, bevor er eine Antwort gibt. Der Duce war erfreut ueber die Nachricht und sagte: Wir sind jetzt am Rande eines Krieges zwischen den Kontinenten, welchen ich bereits im Jahre 1939 vorausgesagt habe. Was bedeutet dieses neue Ereignis? In jedem Falle bedeutet es, dass Roosevelt Erfolg mit seinem Manoever hatte. Da er nicht sofort und direkt in den Krieg eintreten konnte, ist er indirekt eingetreten, indem er sich von Japan angreifen liess. Weiterhin bedeutet dieses Ereignis, dass jede Aussicht auf Frieden weiter und weiter hinausgeschoben ist und dass es jetzt leicht ist, viel zu leicht, einen langen Krieg voraus zu sagen. Wer wird im Stande sein, am laengsten aushalten zu koennen? Von dieser Grundlage aus muss das Problem betrachtet werden. Berlins Antwort wird etwas verzoegert werden, weil Hitler nach der suedlichen Front gegangen ist, um Kleist zu sehen, dessen Armeen weiterhin unter dem Druck einer unerwarteten Sowjetoffensive zurueck fallen.

4. Dezember
Donnerstag

Berlins Reaktion zu dem japanischen Schritt ist ausserge-woehnlich vorsichtig. Sie werden vielleicht zustimmen, weil sie nichts anderes tun koennen, aber der Gedanke Amerikas Einmischung zu provozieren, gefaellt ihnen weniger und weniger. Mussolini auf der anderen Seite ist sehr erfreut darueber.....

5. Dezember
Freitag

Eine Nacht gestoert durch Ribbentrops Rastlosigkeit. Nach Verzoegerung von zwei Tagen kann er jetzt nicht eine Minute warten, den Japanern zu antworten und um drei Uhr morgens sandte er Mackensen zu meinem Haus, um einen Plan fuer ein Dreier-Abkommen bezueglich der Japanischen Einmischung und der Versicherung keinen separaten Frieden abzuschliessen, zu unterbreiten. Er wollte, dass ich den Duce aufwecke, aber ich habe es nicht getan und der letztere war sehr froh, dass ich es nicht gemacht habe.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS
CONTINUED

8. Dezember
Montag

Ein naechtlicher Telefonanruf von Ribbentrop; er ist ueberfroh ueber die japanischen Angriffe auf Amerika. Er war so gluecklich darueber, dass ich mit ihm gluecklich bin, obgleich ich nicht zu sicher ueber endgueltige Vorteile ueber das was passiert ist bin. Eine Sache ist nun gewiss: dass Amerika in den Kampf eintreten wird und dass der Kampf so lang sein wird, dass es in der Lage sein wird, alle seine Kraefte verfuegbar zu machen. Ich habe es heute morgen dem Koenig erzaehlt, der sehr erfreut ueber das Ereignis gewesen ist. Er endete, indem er zugab, dass ich auf "lange Sicht" Recht haben moege. Mussolini war ebenfalls gluecklich. Er war seit einer langen Zeit fuer eine endgueltige Klaerung der Beziehungen zwischen Amerika und der Axis.

CERTIFICATE OF PATIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS

21. November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT., 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document 2987-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT.
33779426

H1125-0052

R DOCUMENTS

H1125-0052A

H1125-0053

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-140
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

 Exhibit U.S.A. 160
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

The Reich Air Minister
and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
Aide-de-Camp
Major Conrath

Berlin, W.8, 11 July 38
3 Leipziger Str.
Staff Headquarters
Telephone 12 00 44

S E C R E T

Staff HQ - Dept II No. 134/38 secret

To
General U d e t

Enclosed I transmit a copy of the shorthand minutes on the conference with the airplane manufacturers on 8 July 1938 at Carinhall.

(Signed) Conrath
Major

1 Enclosure.

Dr. Eggeling/Ba

Conference
with the gentlemen of the airplane industry
at Karinhall
8th July 1938, 1130

Field Marshal G o e r i n g :

Gentlemen: May I first welcome you here and express my satisfaction that we have come here together again to discuss our problems. Today I invited you into the country, in order to have you later on as my guests, thus giving expression to the feelings of solidarity between us.

Before we start our discussions I am in duty bound to commemorate here too the man who, being one of you, always was among the first to press for the development of German aviation and of the German Air Force. It is a grievous loss which the aviation industry has suffered through the departure of your member, Mr. Hellmut Hirth.
(Those present rise from their seats.)

I thank you.

Page 2
Gentlemen: The situation today does not differ from that which existed at the time of my last address except perhaps for the fact that it is even more serious today. You are aware that today it is no longer Germany on whose attitude the continuance of peace depends. It is Czechoslovakia who threaten the peace like the sword of Damocles. We do not know what will happen. But you are aware, Gentlemen, that, in case something happens there, Germany will not be able to be disinterested. As long ago as May it became manifest that raving individuals of Czechoslovakia thought the time had come to provoke Germany while hoping that such provocation would start a world war, in which one side was probably to consist of France and England, Russia, America as the main forces, while Germany perhaps assisted by small countries interested in areas of Czechoslovakia on the other side. They hoped to catch just the last moment when conditions were still favorable enough to overwhelm Germany. We have not been provoked, and probably the other side also was too anxious for peace after all to allow further provocation. There can be no doubt that England does not wish for war nor does France. As to America, there is no certainty on this question. The economic situation of America is hopeless. Therefore the Americans might hope to do big business again by providing all the munitions for the enemies of Germany, while not themselves actively intervening for the time being, but by dispatching many airmen at least as volunteers.
Page 3.
The Jew furthermore agitates for war all over the world. So much is clear: Antisemitism has risen now in every country as a logical consequence of the over-increase of the number of Jews in these countries, and the Jew can expect salvation only if he succeeds in letting loose a general world war. If I mention the Jewish agitation for war, I have a good reason to do so, since the Jew who dominates the bulk of the world press is in a position to use it for psychological propaganda.

With regard to England too, we have to acknowledge the existence of some, I don't want to say, readiness for war, but of a certain feeling of the unavoidability of war which is wide spread. To be added is the fact that wide circles in England

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TAKE

take this stand: the last thing we are prepared to bear was the incorporation of Austria, but we are not ready to allow any further enlargement of Germany's power. Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Romanian oil wells etc. Moreover since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since in this case we would put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.

Briefly, gentlemen, this is what is happening on the political plane. In this circle, however, we have less to do with politics. I told you these things only in order to provide some background. What we have to discuss are the conclusions which have to be drawn, especially with regard to the Air Force. Everywhere we observe indeed immense preparations for mobilization, and I expect nobody to become frightened to death. If I judge the preparations for mobilization which are undertaken by other nations by their press publications, in which these countries, I dare say, shoot their mouth off, one might feel inclined to get the jitters. But if they write there: "England is to produce within the next year so and so many thousands of first line planes of which so and so many will be ready a month, France will build this and that, Russia is now again to produce another 100,000 planes and to train so and so many airmen", then think of the difficulties which we have to overcome and translate what we have into a democratic system, and then you will be able to make a correct guess. I am perfectly convinced gentlemen, that what we can produce of new goods within a year, England is able to produce with the utmost pains in two, perhaps three years. This is how I judge the situation, taking into consideration the establishment of factories etc.

You heard tall stories about the English shadow factories. But what happened in fact? These people did not even complete the conversion of their existing factories, let alone the erection of shadow factories, the essence of which is that they are not working today, but may be switched on tomorrow. And how far have they gone with their second great project for the motor-or-plane industry which this Automobile King Nuffield has set up? The latest report is this that this Honourable Lord now has made up in his mind, and almost decided where he will build these shadow factories, therefore in the best possible case has chosen their location. You know now much it takes to build a big factory , and I think, it cannot be done in such a hurry. If on the one hand they introduce the 40hr week or even go down to 35 hours a week, and on the other hand we are working 10 or 11 or 12 hours a day instead of 8 hours, then this discrepency must at the end favor the man who works longer, and work is what matters for results.

But still we have to keep in mind that from the long term view these people too certainly will have some results, and before all that England and France do not stand alone on the opposite side, but are always in a position to draw upon the immense reservoir for raw materials in America.

If I compare the Air Forces of the principal countries which may become our enemies(by which I always mean England and France), I am bound to day:

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we have done marvellous work indeed! In 1933 we were at zero, today, 1938, at the end of the year, Germany will have a complete first line strength equal to that of England's strength plus ..... Thus we are superior in quantity, too, and as to quality we are equal, even superior. This is an enormous success. It is a miracle that we were able to do it.

And here you deserve great credit, gentlemen, for having succeeded in establishing factories from nothing, and finally producing in them planes and motors which are equal to-day and partly superior.

Altogether, I consider the German Air Force as being ahead compared with the English as well as with the French. Our task is, not only to keep, but also to increase this advantage. For if it comes to the decision, we shall again be opposed by a great multitude, considering the world reservoir at the disposal of the enemies. We have to endeavor, therefore, to increase our advantage, at least in the air, by producing highest quality and at the same
Page 7 time in enormous masses, and I am firmly resolved to take every measure which can and will provide us with permanent superiority in the air.

It is for this reason that I have to approach you again, gentlemen, with a demand to provide loyally and passionately those conditions which will allow me to increase that advantage. I am aware that there are great difficulties, and one of these difficulties consisted and still consists in the so-called shortage ofraw materials. Gentlemen, shortage of raw materials !'Indeed' everyone has less iron than he needs. But if you come to think of it that we now manufacture almost 2.000 tons of raw iron a month, then that is something immense. We are to-day producing more iron than France and England combined. Only our needs are so immensely great. The same applies to aluminum .. I increased our requirements for aluminum under the Air Ministry plans, later in the frame of the Four Years Plan, from 32.000 tons a year to 150.000 tons a year as of today ; then after the end of this year 180.000 tons, and by the end of 1939, to 288.000 tons. And even this will not be quite enough. Now you can roughly estimate, if you compare the aluminum quota at the disposal of the rest of the world, how much they can produce from aluminum. Although one should not forget that there are many cases where we are forced to use aluminum, while other people can use other materials owing to their richness in raw materials. Yet much has been done also with
Page 8 regard to raw materials, and if I just altered the contingents again and allotted to the Armed Forces 500.000 and lately even 550.000, possibly even 600.000 tons, these are also enormous figures.

We shall make it alright. What matters is only that everybody knows he has to be careful, that material is short, but that the manufacture must not be impeded. Everything often depends on the right distribution of materials, in order to balance temporary shortages and prevent stoppages of work. Moreover the demands often are for much more than is really needed or is said to be needed.

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Now, if I touch once more on the political problem, this is because you felt the consequences of the political situation in the increase of the program, and that we have to request that everybody do his best, and that all our labor supply must be used. We are fully embarked on the way to mobilisation-capacity and shall not be able for years to deviate from it; on the contrary, we may have to increase our speed under certain conditions until we reach full mobilisation capacity.

Gentlemen, please consider the far reaching consequences; you ought to be aware that the smallest faults and omissions cannot be caught up with, and repaired, if we work with such speed. I have to ask you therefore to be in a state of the greatest readiness. It is the fate of Germany which is at stake. Your job is not to be politicians. But if you sometime have a quiet half hour to ponder on the history of the era after
Page 9 the world war, you will become convinced that, in case a combination of powers today would succeed a second time in overwhelming Germany, the end of the Reich would be there. These people have been forewarned now, they know what a germany totally prostrated can create anew, if she only remains united. This is what they have learned, and they will act accordingly.

Gentlemen, the following is my personal belief: Wherever the conflagration may begin - if then Germany must go to war - this will be the greatest hour of destiny ever since there has been a German history. And the possibility of victory indeed exists. It depends solely on our own power, on the manner in which we mobilise that power, and on the degree to which everybody is resolved to do his bit, convinced as he is that afterwards every individual will experience personally the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the situation. Believe me, Gentlemen: once Germany has again lost a new War, it will be no use for you to go and say: Yes I did not want this war, I was always opposed to it, moreover I was opposed to the system and never wanted collaborate with it. You will be dismissed with scornful laughter. You are Germans: the others don't care two hoots whether you wanted to collaborate or not.

We have to see things as they are. The situation being what it is, I believe there is still a 10% to 15% possibility for a relatively small scale action, but I am convinced that a 80, 85, 90% chance exists that a
Page 10 greater disaster will occur anyhow, and that we shall have to fight the great battle of which I am not afraid. The only thing that matters is that we shall not collapse again. What matters is that everybody knows: Victory can be ours only if we work to an immensely higher extent. We have to replace by men everything the other side has more in raw materials. This is why the determination of every single German has to be much stronger than that of the enemy in question. And the determination of a nation that knows its very existence is at stake, will necessarily be stronger than that of people who are only half resolved and only go along in the war, and the agitation, etc.

Those are not phrases, gentlemen. For God's sake do not understand them as nationalistic blusterings, you would do me a great injustice. I am passionately convinced that everything I tell you is an absolute, gigantic truth. I am truly of the opinion: we shall not be able to save our fatherland unless we stake all our passions.

Believe me, gentlemen, I have now learned during these years, what it means to bear continually the responsibility for a nation. If you are concerned about your work, this is indeed a grave responsibility. But what it means if a man is aware that on his own counsel, decision, judgment, and deliberation lastly depends the fate of the nation, this is beyond your im-
Page 11 agination. You may be certain, seldom indeed do I have any other thought in my mind. Actually I have to force myself to think of other things; all the time my thoughts are circling around one thing: When will war come? Shall we win? What can we do? I assure you, gentlemen, it is hour after hour that I ponder: What can we do? I am well aware that there are still

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infinitely more things we could do. I am aware that many things are not yet ready, I am aware of the many obstacles in our way, and I am very sorry that I am unable to do everything as quickly as I would like. I wished, however, I might be able to say later on with regard to the task which has been given to me: Well, every preparation which a man can make has been made by us. It is a bad thing if a man has to confess, when the battle has started: Damn it, you could have done this before. This responsibility rests heavily on me, you may believe me.

This is why I again beg of you with all my heart, gentlemen: Consider yourself an industry which has the duty to create an Air Force which is most intimately connected with that Air Force. Do understand that all personal interests take second place. What does your work mean compared with the fate of the nation? What value have after all the considerations which will often occur to you: Well, what are we to do afterwards, if now the capacities become so much inflated? Would it not be better to go a little more slowly in order to distribute the work better? Such thoughts would prove nothing - don't take this amiss, gentlemen, but an extremely petty character. What does it matter, if there will come a day when you
age 12 have to manufacture chamber pots instead of planes? That is of no importance if there is only now a chance for Germany to win the struggle.

For if I spoke so far briefly of the fate which would befall us if we lost the war, I may be allowed now to mention what will happen if we win it. Then Germany will be the greatest power in the world, then it is Germany who dominates the world market, then will be the hour when Germany is a rich nation. For this goal, however, we have to undertake risks, we have to stake our bets. This is why I once again demand of you: all the questions ruminating in your heads, all ideas of external or internal importance, any doubts whether you can obtain higher prices, whether you might make insufficient profits, etc. all this is perfectly beside the point. What matters is only this: What is the production of the works; how many motors are being made and in what time, and of what quality are these motors and planes? Only this is important. And even if you know what you are doing now may mean that within three years your firm will collapse, you will have to do it all the same. For if Germany collapses, who will dare to tell me to my face that his shop will go on? Out of the question! If only this fact would be understood by the whole of the German economy - although the dictate of Versailles in 1918 should indeed have been a good teacher to them - and if all would understand that nobody here exists by himself, but that everybody stands and falls with Germany's existence! It does not matter if someone says: I disapprove entirely of the National Socialist system. I don't care, let him disapprove,
e 13 it is still the system which at this moment decides Germany's fate. This is why he has willy-nilly to cooperate. Therefore I repeat once more: only that nation which stakes everything on its armaments and draws all consequences from this fact, will be able to continue its existence.

Gentlemen, I have no reason, and this is gratifying to me, to complain of the airplane industry but to praise, to acknowledge, and to thank. You went my way on the whole, though at the start one or the other did not quite catch what it meant and you did really wonderful work, in some factories quite extraordinary things were done. Thus just with regard to the airplane industry I have no reason for complaints, thank God. Just this fact permits me to say, especially as it cannot happen in this industry, not for a second, and I mean second, would I hesitate - as I proved with regard to another matter - to intervene at once and to confiscate at once the whole business in case I should come to the conclusion that he does not understand that he can see the world only under the toilet-seat perspective of his own enterprise, and cannot look further. Such a fellow is a ne'er-do-well. That fellow must go. By a stroke of my pen he would lose his business and his property. But as I said before, and I am very gratified to state this once again, that the airplane industry performed quite excellent work.

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But, gentlemen, we must not rest on our laurels, our performance must encourage us to perform still more. If I said some moments ago that the raw material situation is and will remain difficult, the situation regarding labor supply is perhaps still more difficult. This is by no means surprising. Imagine, in 1933 we had almost 7 million unemployed, and today the greatest problem of Germany is where to find enough workers to complete the most urgent tasks. I believe, a leadership which led to such results has some justification for its existence. If today some degree of prosperity exists in other countries, if for instance a country like Sweden is in excellent circumstances, then it is very wrong if this country scoffs on Germany, since it is indebted for its prosperity to nobody but Germany and her re-armament. Anyway this labor supply problem is difficult indeed. It was with difficulty that I made decided on the law enacted recently, a law which intervenes to a truly enormous extent in the freedom of movement of every individual. If a worker can be told today you are finished here, pack up your things and start tomorrow at such and such a place, this means indeed quite something! If despite this fact I resolved to issue this law, you ought to be able to comprehend how difficult the situation is, but also that we shall dodge no issue. As long as there are any chances of balancing the situation, I shall take these chances.

As for the airplane industry, here again of course the most difficult problem is that of providing skilled workers. But we have devised means and ways to attain our goal.

(An admonition follows on the training of as many apprentices as possible.)

Page 16 Beyond this, gentlemen, I want you to be perfectly clear, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier you can make clear proposals on this to me, the earlier you know yourselves what you want, including the changes in personnel, what people you want to get rid of, and what people you want to have, the earlier you will be all right, and the less danger there will be of work being held up. If you act in this way, we should be able to apply in time to the Inspectorates for Recruiting for deferments on the basis of your claims, so that the moment mobilisation starts, everything will have been arranged already. You will then be in a position to know: when mobilisation starts, so-and-so will be taken away, but you will also know who will replace him. I should like to have this arranged almost by names. I want every man and woman to know: on the first, the second, the third day of mobilisation I shall have to do this and that, so that the order of events will not be: the airplane industry will be allotted a certain number out of the bulk of available labor, etc., and then the allotments will be altered four or five times. No, this will have to be done from the beginning, by names. I want the airplane industry to take again the first place and go ahead by appointing a special employee in each factory who has nothing to do but to make the arrangements for mobilisation, so that every shop knows accurately: I shall lose so-and-so, he will be replaced by so-and-so. But with regard to those people who cannot be spared by any means you must apply for deferment already, so that I can order their deferment. If this is being done accurately and executed carefully, you will see what a help that will be. For it is quite clear: there will be a great to-do the day of the mobilisation, and every man will then have to know what he will have to do. And with regard to juvenile labor, to apprentices, I want you to make your decisions also with regard for the mobilisation; it might be advisable to accept already many more apprentices then you would accept normally.

(Some remarks follow on the reorganisation of the Air Ministry and the appointment of Udet)

Page 18 At this point I want to prevent the spreading of a fairy tale in case it should exist. If you'd think that since I have so much to do, I am more or less above things, do not trouble about them and do not know what is going on, you are mistaken; first of all I am seeing the Chief of the C.-Office once a week if not more frequently, and I can assure you that

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nothing of importance is being ordered, really nothing which has not been discussed with, and agreed upon by me first. No sample is dispatched, no order given without my consent, I decide personnally upon each piece to be delivered on the basis of these conferences. Every
Page 19 measure, therefore, which the Chief of the C-Office takes, has been previously discussed in conference lasting many hours.

You know of the new method which General Udet wishes to apply. This method naturally calls for sacrifices. They are necessary however. For what is it which matters? We must have, firstly the best types, secondly as few of them as possible. Thirdly, types which can be built within a short time, which can be built in good quality, and which can be built cheaply. This is, I believe, the result of planning for almost a year. For it has been almost a year since I started the devliberations which led to the method we wish to apply now.

It goes without saying, gentlemen, we shall communicate to you the demands which we have with regard to the machines we want. You shall have a chance to build that machine in free competition. Then we shall have to decide what machine it is which suits us. And this today is often very difficult to decide. Often we had to ponder very long when we had to decide between two types. Either machine had its advantages, the one these, the other one those. If one has to choose between two machines of which one is good, the other less good, the choice is easy. But to decide on one of them. If both machines are good, this is difficult.
Page 20 And if we chose one, and refused the other, this in many cases did not mean that the one refused was not good; perhaps it was just as good, but some small advantage of the chosen machine tipped the scale after we had considered everything.

But I cannot allow the manufacture of several types. I am well aware of the objections to this opinion. They have been known to me already since the last war.

Page 21 One should not create monopolies, and I don't want to do so. I never asked you, gentlemen, to work in your construction offices in a given direction, i.e. to do everything by order, but there you are free, and every firm is free to produce something better at any moment. But if I made up my mind after the most thorough deliberations and discussions with all responsible people, to choose the bomber, which is to be the backbone of the Air Force, which is to be produced in greatest numbers, then I have the duty to arrange that this type is also produced in the shortest possible time. Gentlemen, the kind of licensing method which we had so far, was never very pleasing to me, for we were forced to acknowledge that a series of accidents - to mention a minor detail - was caused for the following reasons: that with the firms which had licensed things did not quite fit in some place, something stuck, and they gave it one more little jerk, and the part just got in; by such methods tensions were created which later had fatal results. It cannot go on like it did so far, that we say we gave them the license, and let the firm construct and fit the licensed parts. If we have now chosen a certain type, the firm which developed this type carries the central responsibility for the construction and the completion of this type, even where part of the work is done by licensed firms. And the other
Page 22 firms shall produce this type until another type appears in our factories which may perhaps have been constructed by a different firm and which may replace the older type. But the firm which has developed the type chosen by me is responsible to me for the following: that firstly it will be provided the gadgets (Vorrichtungen) drawings, materials and everything else which is necessary, in order to deliver at the end of the manufacturing process the same type in every factory. And this, gentlemen, is the more important because I no longer order: you, please produce license 88, and the other produce the so-and-so licence, but I shall tell you: You produce nothing but the right wing, you nothing but the left wing, you nothing but the glider appliance, you the rump, etc. and at the end

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everything must fit together. And if I proceed to produce the highest possible number of planes, then, gentlemen, you will have to understand that everybody has to march in step. For these small parts are to be produced in various places, and then they must fit and the firm which developed that type will be responsible to me that they do fit. Not the greatest profit ought to matter for you, but before all your more work and better results. There can be no doubt about that.

Gentlemen, I am aware that there are quite a number of objections against this method. But there are objections against every method. But if I balance the advantage and the disadvantages, taking into due consideration the security problem which is so important, I finally come to the conclusion that for the time being this is the right way, which is bound absolutely to bring superiority over the enemy, and I should like to add here over the democratic, the leaderless enemy, for in England it is possible that Lord Nuffield says any plane will be built, if I am not to produce the plane which I want then I shall not produce at all. Yes, such things he can say in England, but not in Germany, thank God, and I only hope he says such things: may God preserve him in this condition. In such a case it goes without saying that one day he will fly around at the front with the most varied types. This is just what will make him inferior. Since we are provided with the principle of organisation, I really would be quite insane if I did not organise these powers and made use of the chance which fate allowed me to have.

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Page 26 Above all, gentlemen, and you will remember that I told you this already in 1933, if you are planning for a new type, the serial manufacture of the current type must not be disturbed by it. Never! These two tasks must be entirely separated from each other. For I know the difficulties inherent in the development of a new type. If I allow this work to interfere, at any stage, with the manufacturing of the serial type, then disadvantages to the serial type are unavoidable. Therefore, full separation must be provided and care must be taken that the serial manufacture never suffers from the work for new development, and neither must the new development be hampered by serial production. For you are fully aware how important it is to develop the new types. It is always decisive that a plane which has been constructed, must be flown as soon as possible. For not until it has been flown, and with which calculations were made are flown, does a basis for further development really exist.

Gentlemen, if later on a history of the German Air Force and its development is written, the writer will call the step which General Udet made with regard to the Ju 88 and in which we followed him, a magnificent action undertaken by the German aviation technique. This is perfectly
Page 27 clear to me. This is why I ask you again to forget your personal ambitions for the benefit of this greatest task of all. You may well be proud, gentlemen, that today we are already in a position to entrust industry with such a task. For I hope I may be sure without any reserve that after adopting this system, even if you were sorry that you had to do it, you will work for it loyally, and that our work will not slacken or be hampered by some dislike on your part - to be careful in my expression. I hope I may rather be convinced that you will tell yourselves, well, I should have preferred a different way, but since the decision was made, there is only one thing: to take up this method with all the power and force at my command.

I mentioned already how glad I am to be able to express my deep satisfaction with what you have created up to now. What is it that we have brought about? We have succeeded in changing a small airplane industry which barely existed with a few types, which was not in a position to keep step with modern development, which had to stop production altogether for some years, etc., into an efficient airplane industry of our very own without foreign patents, foreign licences, and by using exclus-

ively tools of our own. And then came the reorientation which was completed in a single year, moreover the production of modern planes, produced now already in serial types. I believe, gentlemen, we can be proud of the way which the airplane industry has traversed, and this is just what entitles me to trust you and to request of you what I had to request today.

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Page 29 (More admonitions follow to obey orders.)

And finally one more thing. You will not be able to fulfill your duties unless you have a staff which collaborates enthusiastically, and workers who are fully prepared to assist in your task, and I beg of you, consider your workers your colleagues, men by whose intensified zeal alone you will be able to reach your goal. Provide me with this great joy as well, that I may be able to call the German airplane industry an example for the right treatment of the workers. We shall not be able to solve our great problems and to use all this capacity for work unless the worker feels that he is indeed valued at his full worth and treated as a member of the team. On the other hand, gentlemen, you must not close your eyes with regard to certain nihilistic plans if such should become evident. Less than anywhere else can we afford in the airplane industry to allow propaganda hostile to the state. For where does verbal propaganda and action begin? True, if I address the Forces, I
Page 30 have of course to deny every time that sabotage ever occurs. For if I did not do so, if I would allow such considerations to be seriously considered by the Forces, I should shake and undermine all their confidence. The Forces must not even start such considerations. But your duty, gentlemen, is to take care of it that ideas of sabotage etc. disappear entirely from the brains of your personnel even should the individual not agree with our State of today. It is here that we have to be very careful so that nothing can happen for this is where, as I said before, the confidence in your products stands or falls.

If I finally touch the problem of female labor, this is because I am of the opinion that we have to tackle the problem of female labor again in case of mobilisation. Gentlemen, here you must use your brains. A woman is not a man, and it is not enough to say, instead of 500 men, I now employ 500 women, and at this or that place, a worker is a worker whether man or woman. You will have to calculate rather: if you have to lose in case of war this or that number of men, but may receive this or that number of women, you must today already make all preparations for making your factory suitable for female labor. Not in your industry but in another industry I noticed the other day the following: Owing to a reorientation 90 women had been taken on. In the whole factory there was
Page 31 not a single lavatory for women. This isn't the thing. This may be a small matter, simply nobody thought of it, what does it matter? There are other things where we simply have to think of the difference. You must establish separate wash rooms and other things. One cannot simply put the women into the men's wash rooms. One has to acknowlege when women come to work, there must be preparations for them.

One thing is clear, in general you cannot ask as much from a women as from a man. There are certain spheres where the opposite applies, but working in a factory is not one of them. Above all you must be clear on where you can use female labor at all, and where this would be impossible. Accordingly, you must make your arrangements in case of mobilisation. This goes without saying. And I imagine that, if things like the one mentioned before are done right, the dreaded sudden decrease of work need not occur at all, and that I won't have to wait for months for the curve to go up again. Gentlemen, I think I have opened my heart enough. As to certain details you know already from the conference with Udet. I only need to know whether you (to General Udet) wish to add any-
Page 32 thing ('no') or whether everything has been discussed

Gentlemen, I have still one thing to ask. I think it goes without saying that everything which I told you with regard to the political situation and preparations for mobilisation has to remain entirely among ourselves. This goes without saying, and I need hardly add anything. I

chose the participants for this address in such a way that I am entitled to trust entirely their discretion. I should not like to experience the same disappointment which I had when I invited the German industry to the Herrenhaus, when the contents of my speech were already known in a wider circle the same evening.

Later on I shall confer with some gentlemen in order to receive from them some information on certain things. The air tents industry is informed. The same applies in general to the airplane motor industry. Here the main task will be to produce Mercedes "GOIs" in large numbers. As to BMW I put great hopes on the future air..... as an enormous step forward. Until then the most intensified production of the present type has to be continued of course. Juno 211 also has to be produced with the great intensity. Moreover I hope that the motor industry too will not rest content with the fact that they have produced a good motor, but I ask them to prepare and further new developments.

Page 33 Gentlemen, here again I should like to give some advice. In our branch, in aviation and production for the needs of an air force, you cannot attain much without some imagination. This is the sphere where many new developments and inventions can be expected to appear and where one has to reorientate oneself without end. I ask you not to shrink from new thoughts and not to say: but this is impossible! Rather you ought to travel into thin air over and over again, and tell yourselves: here it is, where there must be room for imagination, where my ideas must go on a long voyage. I hope, this is my private wish and dream, a miracle will happen. I still hope that I am shown some day a motor or a weapon or a plane or a bomb, the qualities of which will be fantastic. I still hope for something which has the same importance in the struggle with the enemy as had the needle gun in the war of 1870-71. If I had such a needle gun (to use a metaphor) against an enemy who has nothing but muzzle-loaders our advantage naturally would be great. With these remarks I wish to express my sympathy with boldness in experimenting. I still am not yet in the possession of the stratosphere bomber which overcomes space at a height of 25 and 30 km. This problem has not been solved yet in the sense that practical use is possible. I still am lacking rocket motors which would enable us to effect such flying. I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there. Thus you see, gentlemen, there is still a large field for your work, and what matters is only how high you aim, you will have success in the
Page 34 same proportion.

(Some final, unimportant remarks follow)

Admiral Lahs answers in the name of the industry.

Page 36 I want to thank you also for the remarks in which you acknowledge that we did our best. You, Field Marshal, today opened our eyes to the seriousness of the situation, and you gave us directives in those units and in that direction; and it will naturally be a matter of honor for us to march cheerfully that way. I am of the opinion that our airplane industry will be able to fulfill it without any friction provided it gets the semi-fabricated goods and there will not be too much alteration of plans.

(The remainder of this speech contains some cautious allusions to a dictatorial attitude taken by Udet, otherwise there is nothing of importance.)

H1125-0063

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-140

20 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, Tec 5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. R-140.

GOETZ MAYER,
Tec 5, 33812169.

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